

THE MISSION OF AMPHOTERUS AND THE OUTBREAK OF AGIS' WAR

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MUCH ATTENTION has recently been devoted to the ill-fated war which the Spartan king, Agis III, waged against the Macedonian domination of Greece.¹ Rightly so, for the episode is of crucial importance in determining the strength of Greek resistance to the military and political predominance of Macedon and still more in assessing the priorities of Alexander the Great, once he had turned his back on the Mediterranean seaboard. Unfortunately the extant sources are deficient and inconsistent in matters of chronology, and two rival constructions have emerged. On one hypothesis the revolt in the Peloponnese began in the spring of 331 B.C. and continued until autumn of the same year.² Alternatively, it is argued, the war began in late summer, 331, and continued into the campaigning season of 330.³ The interval between these two chronological outlines is only a few months, but the period is perhaps the most momentous of Alexander's whole reign, the period during which the king moved from Egypt to Ecbatana. It is obviously crucial to determine at what point Alexander heard that full-scale war had broken out in the Peloponnese, for only then can we determine the effectiveness of his response to the emergency. In my opinion a sure *terminus post quem* can be established,

¹The common description of Agis' war as a revolt is misguided and should be abandoned. The Spartans were not allies of Macedon or signatories to the Common Peace imposed after Chaeronea. Technically they were guilty not of *apostasis* but of attacking one of the contracting parties in the Common Peace, Megalopolis. That is correctly observed by Aeschines, when he warns of the risk of the Athenians' being implicated with Sparta and condemned as *δμογνώμονες . . . τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην* (Aesch. 3.254).

²First argued by B. Niese, *Geschichte d. griech. und mak. Staaten* 1 (Gotha 1893) 497–500, and regularly accepted (cf. U. Wilcken, *Alexander the Great*, ed. E. Borza [New York 1967] 145; H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* 2 [Munich 1926] 9 no. 15). The arguments were restated and amplified by E. Badian, "Agis III," *Hermes* 95 (1967) 170–192, esp. 190–192, and his conclusions have been frequently endorsed and modified. Cf. E. N. Borza, "The End of Agis' Revolt," *CP* 66 (1971) 230–235; G. Wirth, "Alexander zwischen Gaugamela und Persepolis," *Historia* 20 (1971) 617–632; R. A. Lock, "The Date of Agis III's War in Greece," *Antichthon* 6 (1972) 15–27; J. R. Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* (London 1973) 87.

³This was the older view; cf. G. Grote, *History of Greece* 10 (London 1888) 219–223; A. Schäfer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* 3² (Leipzig 1887) 201–203; 212–216. The case was briefly restated by G. L. Cawkwell, "The Crowning of Demosthenes," *CQ* 19 (1969) 170–173, but without gaining wide acceptance. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 376–378, keeps an open mind. The works cited in this and the preceding note will henceforward be referred to by the author's name alone.

but only if the sources are scrutinised more thoroughly than has been hitherto attempted.

In the late spring or summer of 331 Alexander reached Tyre on his way to the Euphrates, and, according to Arrian, he commissioned his admiral, Amphoterus, to deal with disturbances in the Peloponnese.

τὰ δὲ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ὅτι αὐτῷ νενεωτερίσθαι ἀπήγγελτο, Ἀμφοτερόν πέμπει βοηθεῖν Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι ἔς τε τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον βέβαιοι ἦσαν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐ κατήκονον. Φοίνιξι δὲ καὶ Κυπρίοις προσετάχθη ἑκατὸν ναῦς ἄλλας πρὸς αἷς ἔχοντα Ἀμφοτερόν ἔπεμπε στέλλειν ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου.

(3.6.3)

There are logically two periods to which this passage could be referred, and both have been canvassed. Arrian might be referring to the prolonged period of preparation during which Agis was building up a mercenary force and occupying Crete in conjunction with the Persian fleet.⁴ Alternatively the passage could refer to the outbreak of hostilities in the Peloponnese and the defeat of the Macedonian general, Corrhagus, at the hands of the coalition force assembled by the Spartans.⁵ Arrian's terminology is irritatingly imprecise. The use of *νενεωτερίσθαι*, for instance, could denote either the outbreak of military action,⁶ or general sedition without military overtones.⁷ But in one phrase in particular the wording is peculiar and has not yet been elucidated. Amphoterus, we are told, was to give assistance to those Peloponnesians *ὅσοι ἔς τε τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον βέβαιοι ἦσαν*, "who could be relied upon for the *Persian* war." This is an exceedingly strange expression to describe the situation after war had broken out and the Megalopolis campaign was in full swing.⁸ For the Peloponnesians, at any rate, the Persian war was then of secondary importance. What would have mattered was the war against Sparta, as Arrian makes clear on a later occasion when he speaks explicitly of *ὁ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πόλεμος* (3.16.10). That is the expression we should have expected at 3.6.3, if Arrian believed that war was raging in the Peloponnese and Megalopolis under siege.

What, then, does Arrian mean by loyalty to the Persian war? There was one particular area in which Greek cities could prove their *βεβαιότης*, and that was in providing troops for the Asian front. Alexander had a

⁴Arr. 2.13.4–6; Curt. 4.1.37–40; Diod. 17.48.1–2.

⁵Aesch. 3.165; Deinarchus 1 (c. *Demosth.*) 34; Diod. 17.62.7–8.

⁶Cf. 1.7.1 and 4 (the Theban *νεωτερισμός*).

⁷Cf. 1.1.2 (the Athenian unrest in 336).

⁸Borza, 230 n. 3, comments that Arrian uses a curious phrase, but he draws no conclusions. Wirth, 627 n. 55, suggests that Arrian's expression is meant to illustrate the interdependence of the European and Asian fronts, which at least shows awareness of the problem. Arrian's wording, however, offers no support for his hypothesis that the real purpose of Amphoterus' mission was to convey Amyntas' troops to Asia.

continual and pressing need for mercenaries, primarily to fill out garrisons and satrapal armies, and the Peloponnese had for decades been a fruitful recruiting ground. It seems that Alexander had begun a recruiting drive there as early as the winter of 334/3, when Cleander was sent to the Peloponnese to levy troops.⁹ The mission took more than a year. Cleander only rejoined the Macedonian army during the middle stages of the siege of Tyre,¹⁰ in the late spring of 332, and the 4,000 mercenaries with him were not an impressive total. There may well have been resistance to his recruiting. Agis was beginning to build up his mercenary forces, and, even before Issus, Taenarum had been established as a military base.¹¹ There was now a rival market in the Peloponnese, and the terms of service Agis offered could easily have seemed more attractive than fighting in the Levant with the Macedonian king.¹² Meanwhile Alexander's need for mercenaries continued acute. There were obviously large wastages in the epic sieges of Tyre and Gaza, as well as in equipping a reasonable holding army for the Syrian seaboard. At any rate, immediately after the fall of Gaza a phalanx commander, Amyntas, son of Andromenes, was despatched with ten triremes to Macedon to raise further troops.¹³ It was November, and the voyage must have been hazardous,¹⁴ its danger a measure of the importance Alexander placed on the raising of reinforcements. Now Amyntas was active in the Peloponnese as well as in Macedon, and by the time he finally rejoined Alexander in late 331 he had with him another contingent of 4,000 Peloponnesian infantry.¹⁵ Most of Amyntas' recruiting was clearly done in the spring of 331, precisely the time of Agis' most intensive activity gathering troops and support. We

⁹Arr. 1.24.2. According to Arrian, Cleander was sent to the Peloponnese at the same time as the *νεόγαμοι* were sent on furlough to Macedonia, after the siege of Halicarnassus in autumn 334. Curtius, however, dates the mission immediately before the arrival at Celaenae in spring 333 (3.1.1). That is probably correct; Arrian, or his source, will have lumped together two generically similar notices for convenience of narration.

¹⁰Arr. 2.20.5; Curt. 4.3.11.

¹¹Arr. 2.13.6; cf. Badian 175–177.

¹²It is clear that before Issus the Macedonian army was not heavily favoured to defeat Darius. In Greece the prevailing sentiment seems to have been that Alexander's men would be crushed by the Persian cavalry (Aesch. 3.164), while in Syria the locals confidently expected a Persian victory (Diod. 17.32.4; Jos. *AF* 11.315–316). Even in Alexander's camp there was some failure of morale. The mysterious Tauriscus at least seems to have considered that desertion to the campaigns of Alexander the Molossian in Italy was a more desirable option than to stay and face Darius (Arr. 3.6.7). Under these circumstances there can hardly have been much enthusiasm in the Peloponnese to enlist with Cleander.

¹³Diod. 17.49.1; Curt. 4.6.30–1. Curtius comments pertinently, *namque etiam secundis atterebantur tamen copiae*.

¹⁴On the rarity of winter voyages in antiquity, see L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton 1971) 270–274.

¹⁵Diod. 17.65.1; Curt. 5.1.41.

can be fairly certain that his future allies in Elis, Achaea, and Arcadia would not have been enthusiastic to supply forces for the Macedonian king. Details of resistance to recruiting must have reached Alexander in the early part of 331, and that presumably was the reason why Amphoterus was sent from Tyre, to stiffen the morale of Macedonian allies and prevent more potential troops being diverted by the Spartans. Alexander, it is true, had no illusions about Spartan attitudes to Macedon, and as early as the time of Issus he apparently regarded Sparta as *περιφανὴς ἐχθρά*.¹⁶ But Arrian still places the emphasis on the Persian war. Alexander still thought it preferable to raise troops from the Peloponnese to supplement his armies in Asia rather than to concentrate on the threat in Greece.

Curtius affords some corroboration for this interpretation of Arrian. At the end of a series of notices about administrative details, placed immediately before the arrival in Tyre, he states that Amphoterus was sent to Crete to counter the Persian and Spartan forces blockading the island, and adds that he had a general commission to clear the seas of pirates.¹⁷ The notice is *prima facie* inconsistent with Arrian and has been largely ignored, an unfortunate consequence of the traditional dogma that the only Alexander source worth consulting is Arrian's *Anabasis*. Where Curtius' evidence has been adduced, the result has been an unfortunate conflation. Amphoterus, it is argued, was already in Crete, and at Tyre Alexander recalled him to tackle the more serious uprising in the Peloponnese.¹⁸ This is difficult. We are forced to assume either that Curtius' source was mistaken or that Curtius himself has made a gross blunder. Nothing in his wording indicates that the notice is resumptive. On the contrary, we are explicitly told that Amphoterus was sent from the Palestinian coast directly to Crete, and there is no hint that the Peloponnese was intended as his real objective. No source in fact even insinuates that Amphoterus was in Crete before spring 331. The last previous reference to him was to his activity in recapturing Cos in summer 332,¹⁹ and he could easily have rejoined Alexander in Memphis over

¹⁶Arr. 2.15.5; cf. Curt. 3.13.15. The two authorities differ radically and bafflingly over the identity of the ambassadors captured at Damascus, but both agree that the captives included Spartans. Certainly Arrian's account of the king's attitude to Sparta is likely to be correct. The Spartans had refused to cooperate with the Macedonian throne in any way (cf. Arr. 1.1.2), and Alexander commemorated their recalcitrance in his Granicus dedication (Arr. 1.16.7). Even before the discovery of negotiations with Persia there was every reason to call Sparta an outright enemy.

¹⁷Curt. 4.8.15: *Amphoterus deinde, classis praefectus, ad liberandam Cretam missus—namque et Persarum et Spartanorum armis pleraque eius insulae obsidebantur—ante omnia mare a piraticis classibus vindicare iussus*.

¹⁸Argued by Berve, 2.33 no. 68, and adopted by Badian, 181, and Wirth, 627.

¹⁹Arr. 3.2.6.

the winter of 332/1, as did his colleague Hegelochus.²⁰ There is no reason to doubt what Arrian and Curtius both state, that Amphoterus was sent out from Alexander's court. He was not transferred from one front to another.

It should be emphasized that the immediate context in Arrian is similar to that in Curtius. Curtius sets the mission of Amphoterus in a series of notices, all of which have their counterpart in Arrian, although he distributes them over the whole period between the arrival in Egypt and the second visit to Tyre. The punishment of the tyrants of Methymna is placed by Arrian immediately before the visit to Ammon.²¹ The Rhodian, Chian, and Mytilenean delegations must presumably be included in those successful embassies from Greece that, according to Arrian, approached Alexander before he left Memphis.²² Lastly, the Athenian appeal for the release of their citizens captured at the Granicus is dated by Arrian to Tyre, immediately before the mission of Amphoterus.²³ Clearly Curtius, or his source, has accumulated a number of passing notices and lumped them together in a convenient pausing place in his main narrative. That device is common to all Alexander historians, Arrian included. There are also demonstrably a number of places where our sources mention the same administrative arrangements but insert them at different points in the story.²⁴ That is clearly the case with the mission of Amphoterus. Curtius and Arrian both mention the fact that he was sent off by Alexander, but they vary about the time and the purpose of his commission.

Amphoterus' orders as Curtius gives them are eminently sensible in the context of 331, provided that the conflict around Megalopolis had not yet broken out. After the unwelcome news of Alexander's victory at

²⁰Arr. 3.2.3–7. Hegelochus alone is mentioned reporting to Alexander, but we cannot infer that Amphoterus was left in the Aegean. Arrian clearly implies that he was at court—'Ἀμφότερον πέμπει (3.6.3). Arrian continually uses *πέμπειν* and its compounds to describe Alexander's sending men from his own person (cf. 1.24.2–3; 25.3–9; 2.2.1; 5.1 etc.), but never, as far as I can see, to describe a commission to a man away from his court. For Arrian's usage in such a case see 1.29.3: *καὶ Παρμενίωνι ἐπέστειλεν . . . ἐκεῖσε ἀπαντᾶν*.

²¹Arr. 3.2.7; Curt. 4.8.11.

²²Curt. 4.8.12–13; Arr. 3.5.1—*καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντινα ἀτυχήσαντα ὧν ἐδεῖτο ἀπέπεμψε*. These many embassies presumably included the celebrated delegation from Miletus, which, according to Callisthenes, conveyed oracles to Memphis *περὶ τῆς ἐκ Διὸς γενέσεως* (Strabo 17.1.43 [814] = *FGH Hist* 124 F 14a).

²³Arr. 3.6.2; Curt. 4.8.12; cf. also Aesch. 3.162.

²⁴Compare the different accounts of the arrival of Amyntas' reinforcements and the mission of Menes of Pella, placed by Arrian at Susa (3.16.9–11), by Curtius at Babylon (5.1.40–2), and by Diodorus between Babylon and Susa (17.65.1—he places Menes' mission during the stay in Babylon [64.5]). The most celebrated instance of chronological variation is, of course, the accounts of the foundation of Alexandria, placed before the Ammon visit by Arrian and Plutarch and afterwards by Diodorus, Curtius, and Justin.

Issus Agis had turned his attention to Crete, first sending his brother, Agesilaus, "to order things there," and later intervening in person (Arr. 2.13.6). Part of the reason was no doubt, as some have suggested, to acquire mercenaries from a prime recruiting ground.²⁵ The sources, however, suggest that the Spartan king was acting in close cooperation with the remnants of the Persian fleet, and acting in the Persian cause.²⁶ That is more than likely. In 332 the Persian fleet was hamstrung by the defection of its most numerous contingents, the Phoenicians and Cypriots. After the news of Issus their commanders had withdrawn to their homelands to make their peace with the new lord of the Levantine coast.²⁷ Presumably they left the Aegean at the opening of the sailing season, in early April 332. At a stroke the Persian admirals lost over 200 warships, and there can hardly have remained more than a hundred.²⁸ Certainly the Aegean was now at the mercy of Alexander's reconstituted fleet. In the course of 332 city after city fell, usually spontaneously. The Persian admiral, Pharnabazus himself, was captured by surprise at Chios, only to escape custody in Cos.²⁹ By the end of the summer the coastline was

²⁵Badian 177; Wirth 627.

²⁶Diodorus claims that Agis had ships and money from the Persians when he intervened in Crete and forced the inhabitants *τὰ Περσικὰ αἰρεῖσθαι* (17.48.2). Curtius 4.1.38–40 is taken from the same source, but Curtius clearly adapts his original more than Diodorus, implying that there was already a Macedonian presence in the island. Both sources, however, imply that Agis' primary aim was the military occupation of Crete, not merely the recruiting of mercenaries. That is what Arrian also states (2.13.6). Agesilaus was sent out to Crete *ὡς τὰ ἐκεῖ καταστήσόμενον*, i.e., to settle the island in the Spartans' favour (for parallels see Arr. 5.20.7, 5.27.7).

²⁷Arr. 2.20.1–3; Curt. 4.3.11. The Phoenician fleet had not moved until the news of Issus reached them and it was obvious that Phoenicia was vulnerable to the enemy army. Issus was fought probably in late October (Arr. 2.11.10; cf. W. Judeich ap. J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder* 4 [Berlin 1924–1931] 364 n. 1), and the news will have reached the Aegean in a matter of weeks. At least Pharnabazus was still able to cross from Siphnos to Chios with a squadron of twelve ships and then retire to Halicarnassus (Arr. 2.13.4–6; cf. Curt. 4.1.37). But the extreme winter would then have set in and the sailing season closed for large fleets (cf. Veget. 4.39—the seas were closed from 10 November to 10 March). It seems very unlikely that the Phoenician and Cypriot fleets left the safety of Halicarnassus before the early spring of 332.

²⁸According to Arrian, the deserters from the Aegean fleet who put into Sidon comprised 80 Phoenician warships and 120 led by the kings of Cyprus (Arr. 2.20.1 and 3; cf. Plut. *Alexander* 24.5; Curt. 4.3.11). At its most numerous the Aegean fleet had totalled 400 (Arr. 1.18.5—summer 334). That was a maximum. Memnon apparently had only 300 during the naval war of 333 (Diod. 17.29.2), and the withdrawal of mercenary forces in midsummer 333 reduced the numbers drastically (Arr. 2.2.1; cf. 2.13.2). Subsequently Pharnabazus' main squadron numbered only 100 ships (Arr. 2.2.2; 2.13.4), and the entire fleet at the end of 333 cannot have totalled much more than two hundred. After the mass desertion of spring 332 Pharnabazus' reserves in the Aegean will have been meagre indeed.

²⁹Arr. 3.2.3–6; Curt. 4.5.14–22. Pharnabazus' subsequent fate is not recorded, but presumably he made his way to Crete and joined the hostilities there. He survived

swept clear of Persian occupation from Tenedos to Halicarnassus, and the logical place to take refuge was Crete, where a denuded fleet could hold out indefinitely. Agis was using his military forces, as well as the moral persuasion a Spartan king could exert on a Dorian population,³⁰ to secure a base for the Persian fleet. In return he received continued subsidies from the Persian high command to continue his build-up of mercenaries at Taenarum. At the end of the year Crete seems to have been largely in the hands of the Perso-Spartan coalition, and it would not be surprising if Alexander sent forces to eradicate this last centre of Persian resistance in the west.

Curtius also mentions a wider commission to clear the seas of pirates. Once again, this fits nicely into the historical context. After the Social War of 357–355 had crippled the naval strength of the Second Athenian Confederacy, there appears to have been a resurgence of piracy in the eastern Aegean. At least during the 340s Athens was to honour Cleomis of Methymna for ransoming citizens captured by pirates.³¹ The naval war in the Aegean from 334 onwards seems to have given a tremendous boost to piracy, and, especially as their fleet declined in numbers, the Persians encouraged privateering. When Aristonicus of Methymna and Pharnabazus fell into Macedonian hands in 332, they both had pirate vessels under their command,³² and one of the charges laid against Agonippus, the head of the Eresian junta, was that he had indulged in piracy.³³ In the troubled conditions of the late 330s piracy in the Aegean must have reached epidemic proportions, and the Athenians at least were sufficiently worried in 334/3 to send out a special squadron under the general Diotimus *εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν λειστών*.³⁴ That Amphoterus had a general commission to put down piracy as well as a particular task in Crete is overwhelmingly likely.

The descriptions of Amphoterus' mission in our two sources can easily be explained against the background of the situation before

Alexander's reign, for he is attested commanding a cavalry hipparchy under Eumenes in 321 (Plut. *Eum.* 7.1; Berve 2.380 no. 766).

³⁰Agis' father, Archidamus III, had answered a Cretan appeal before moving on to Tarentum (ca 340). He intervened in favour of the Lycians, destroying the remains of the Phocian mercenary forces, and no doubt created a reservoir of good will in favour of Sparta (cf. Diod. 16.62.4).

³¹*IG* 2².284 = Tod, *GHI* 2 no. 170.

³²Arr. 3.2.4—*ἐν ἡμιολίαις ληστρικαῖς πέντε*; Curt. 4.5.18; 21. The encouragement of piracy began with Memnon, who seems to have commandeered the merchantmen which put in at Cape Sigri in Lesbos (Arr. 2.1.2).

³³*OGIS* 8.5; 54 = Tod no. 191.

³⁴*IG* 2².1623. 277 ff. *Pace* Tod 2.288, there is no reason to connect this expedition with piracy in Etruria. In 334/3 pirates were a much more immediate threat in the Aegean than in the west.

open warfare broke out in the Peloponnese. If the Megalopolis campaign had begun, Arrian's terminology, as we have seen, is wildly inappropriate. The notice in Curtius is difficult also. Why should Amphoterus have been sent to Crete when a far more dangerous situation loomed to the north? The only period consistent with the accounts of the sources is that of the situation before open war, when the Spartans were raising forces in the Peloponnese and abetting the Persians in Crete. If we accept this basic postulate, it becomes far easier to reconcile the versions of Arrian and Curtius. In the west there were various problems, all of which could be tackled by a sizable naval force. In the Peloponnese Spartan influence could be counteracted, allies encouraged, and newly recruited mercenaries given transport east.³⁵ Amphoterus could center his efforts in Crete and send off smaller squadrons to deal with concentrations of pirates. We are not told how many ships he commanded. An additional hundred were to be raised from Phoenicia and Cyprus, and he must have retained the nucleus of the Aegean fleet of 332, which seems to have numbered 160 ships.³⁶ The proposed fleet must have comprised nearly 300 warships, an admirable reservoir from which forces could be despatched to operations throughout the Aegean.

Arrian, however, still presents problems. He limits Amphoterus' activity to the Peloponnese and says nothing about Crete, which, given the Persian presence, must have been the most important sphere of operations. It is possible, though unlikely, that he was merely careless, reproducing only the first objective in a longer list provided by his sources. Ptolemy, if he were indeed Arrian's source here, could have mentioned Crete as well as the Peloponnese. But it is not characteristic of Arrian to abbreviate the lists in his sources; he seems to revel in them, delighting in his ability to vary his forms of expression.³⁷ There is another possible explanation. The word *Πελοπόννησος* might be used in an extended sense, including all Hellenic territory south of the Isthmus—and incorporating Crete. This usage is expressly attested by Strabo, who prefaces his survey of Crete with the statement that it belonged to the Peloponnese.³⁸ More

³⁵Wirth, 628 f., has drawn attention to the potentialities of the fleet for conveying reinforcements. His connection of Amphoterus' mission with Amyntas' recruiting is, however, chronologically impossible; cf. p. 36.

³⁶Curt. 4.5.14. This figure, however, is not wholly acceptable. Arrian gives 160 as the strength of Alexander's first Aegean fleet, which was disbanded at Miletus (Arr. 1.18.4). The recurrence of the same figure in a different context is suspicious, and a doublet has been conjectured (cf. Berve 1.160-161).

³⁷Note particularly the complex construction of such lists as Alexander's forces at Gaugamela (3.11.8-12.4) and the administrative arrangements in Egypt (3.5.1-5; see my remarks in *CQ* 24 [1974] 55).

³⁸Strabo 10.4.1 (474): *περὶ τῆς Κρήτης ἐφεξῆς ῥητέον (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐστὶ).*

interestingly, there is evidence from the mid-fourth century B.C. in the *Periplus* attributed to Scylax of Caryanda. This work contains a detailed description of the Peloponnese, beginning with its northern boundary immediately after the Corinthiad.³⁹ "Scylax" then moves round the coast, mentioning Sicyon, Achaea, Elis, Arcadia, Messenia, and Laconia. Having described Laconia, he jumps immediately to Crete⁴⁰ and the Cyclades closest to the Peloponnesian coast. Next he reverts to the mainland⁴¹ and proceeds up the east coast to Argos, Hermione, Troezen, and Epidaurus—*ἐνταῦθα ἡ Πελοπόννησος λήγει*.⁴² It is apparent that "Scylax," like Strabo, regarded Crete as part of the same geographical sector as the Peloponnese proper and subsumed it under the general title.⁴³ Arrian's source, whether Ptolemy or Aristobulus, may have used the same blanket concept and referred succinctly to general operations in the "Peloponnese," meaning activity in Crete as well as in the mainland proper. In both areas there were allies to hearten, Spartan influence to counter, and, of course, mercenaries to recruit. The two sources, then, are not necessarily inconsistent. Arrian is the more laconic and compressed, but what he says can be reconciled with Curtius.

It is now, I hope, established that Amphoterus' mission is not, and cannot be, connected with the outbreak of fighting at Megalopolis. Indeed there is no evidence that Alexander had heard of the war before he sent Menes of Pella to the Syrian coast in December 331 with instructions to disburse funds to Antipater *ἐς τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πόλεμον* (Arr. 3.16.10). This helps explain another problem. Amyntas had been sent from Gaza to raise troops for his king. He seems to have operated remarkably quickly, and he caught up with Alexander in Babylon or Susa (the sources vary) in November or December 331.⁴⁴ The forces he brought were large by any standard, totalling over 15,000, cavalry included.⁴⁵ A contingent of this size must have taken a considerable time over the journey from Greece to Mesopotamia, and it is unlikely that

³⁹[Scylax] 40 = Müller, *GGM* 1.39: *ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἄρχεται ἡ Πελοπόννησος*.

⁴⁰[Scylax] 47: *κατὰ Λακεδαίμονα νήσος κείται Κρήτη*.

⁴¹[Scylax] 48 fin. *ἐπάνειμι δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡπειρον, ὅθεν ἐξετραπόμην*.

⁴²[Scylax] 55.

⁴³There may be an instance of this extended use of *Πελοπόννησος* in Thucydides. At 2.9.2 he refers to *Πελοποννήσιοι . . . οἱ ἐντὸς Ἰσθμοῦ* as though there were Peloponnesians outside the peninsula south of the Isthmus (cf. Classen-Steup 2.295–296; Gomme, *HCT* 2.10). A little later, at 2.9.4, he talks of the islands between the Peloponnese and eastern Crete as though the area formed a single geographical sector.

⁴⁴See nn. 13, 15, and 24.

⁴⁵Diod. 17.65.1; Curt. 5.1.40–1. There were 500 Macedonian cavalry, 6,000 Macedonian infantry, 600 Thracian cavalry, 3,500 *Τραλεῖς* (an Illyrian or Thracian people much in demand as mercenaries during the Hellenistic period — cf. *OGIS* 266.26 with Dittenberger's note), 4,000 Peloponnesian infantry, and somewhat under a thousand cavalry (Diodorus' figure: Curtius gives precisely 380).

they left after midsummer 331. Now, if war had already broken out in the Peloponnese, it is almost inconceivable that Antipater would have allowed such a substantial proportion of the troops available to him to have left for Asia. The Macedonian component alone amounted to half the home army of 334. It may be true that the king's business was hot and reinforcements urgently needed for the Asian front, but, if Antipater was caught between two fires, the rebellion of Memnon in Thrace and war in the Peloponnese,⁴⁶ he would hardly have denuded his forces so drastically.⁴⁷ Even more problematic are the 4,000 Peloponnesian infantry which Amyntas raised. If war had already broken out and Megalopolis was threatened, it is very unlikely that any forces could have been spared for Asia. The Peloponnesian powers were polarized for and against Sparta, and in the crisis both sides needed all the troops they could muster.

There has been a recent attempt by Wirth to meet this difficulty. Amyntas, it is suggested, only left Greece after the battle of Megalopolis. Immediately after the defeat of Agis and his allies Amyntas' troops were transported by Amphoterus' fleet to the Cilician/Syrian seaboard and then led up country to Mesopotamia by forced marches. The whole exercise was an elaborate attempt by Alexander to coordinate the two fronts and make the best possible use of his available manpower.⁴⁸ This entire construction is, I fear, implausible. In the first place Amyntas and his men are made to move at a colossal speed. Megalopolis, whatever chronology is adopted, cannot have been fought before the end of summer 331 (Wirth accepts Curtius' synchronism with Gaugamela), perilously close to the end of the sailing season. Between, roughly, late September and December 331 Amyntas' forces have to march from Megalopolis to some coastal port, take ship for Phoenicia, and then march from the Syrian coast to Susa. With the best will in the world, this is too compressed. Sea transport may have been more economical of time than a march by land, but, even so, Amyntas' contingent of 13,500 infantry and over 2,000 cavalry would have required a considerable fleet, which necessarily travelled at the speed of its slowest member. We have in fact a useful control in the evidence for the transportation of Darius' merce-

⁴⁶Cf. Diod. 17.62.4-6; Badian 179-184.

⁴⁷So Badian 188. Badian considers that Antipater could not have retained Amyntas' troops if the king had wanted them urgently. This, however, understates the regent's dilemma. In 334 he had been left with only 12,000 infantry (Diod. 17.17.5), and in recent years there had been severe losses of manpower caused by the stream of reinforcements to Asia. Ptolemy, Coenus, and Meleager had levied 3,000 foot from Macedon over the winter of 334/3 (Arr. 1.29.4). The terminology at Arr. 1.24.2 suggests that these forces were newly levied troops, not members of the home army, but, even so, Antipater's recruiting capacity must have been reduced significantly. See also the discussion in the Appendix.

⁴⁸Wirth 627-630.

naries from the Aegean fleet to Issus. The Rhodian *condottiere*, Thymondas, collected them from Pharnabazus in Lycia not later than midsummer 333.⁴⁹ The contingent took ship for Tripolis, and finally reached Darius at Sochi,⁵⁰ shortly before the battle of Issus in October. At the least the journey seems to have taken three months—and Darius had as urgent a need for mercenaries as Alexander. Sea transport, then, was not exceptionally fast. But worse, if we accept Wirth's hypothesis, the mission of Menes of Pella with funds for Antipater and the war becomes superfluous and inexplicable.⁵¹ All sources connect this mission closely with the arrival of Amyntas, and, if the decisive battle had taken place and ex-combatants were about to arrive, it makes no sense to talk about the war with Sparta. It seems unavoidable that Amyntas left Greece before the final battle took place, probably as early as June or July 331. Whether he moved by sea or by land (and the size of his cavalry contingent suggests that he went by land), the journey must have taken many months; there is certainly no time to fit in the Megalopolis campaign before his departure.

Amyntas' troop levying, then, fits in well with the mission of Amphoterus. In the early part of 331 Alexander was still trying to squeeze mercenaries out of unpromising recruiting grounds, and as yet there was no full-scale emergency. No doubt Amyntas' departure, together with the weakening of the Macedonian home army that it involved, was one of the main contributory causes of the outbreak of war in the Peloponnese. Antipater is known to have been short-handed, and after Corrhagus' defeat he was a long time gathering an army for the decisive encounter.⁵² It may reasonably be conjectured that Agis took advantage of the fortun-

⁴⁹Arr. 2.2.1–2. The conveyance of these mercenaries began immediately after the surrender of Mytilene (so 2.13.3), which occurred soon after the death of Memnon (Arr. 2.1.3–4; *contra* Diod. 17.29.2). Memnon cannot have died later than the early summer, for news of his death reached Alexander in the course of his march through Galatia/Cappadocia (Plut. *Alexander* 18.5; cf. Curt. 3.1.21), in June or July 333. There is a check in the subsequent actions of Pharnabazus. From Lycia he moved to Tenedos, pacified the island, and then spent some time (unspecified) around Chios (Arr. 2.2.2–3; 2.13.4). Then he moved across the Cyclades and was in Siphnos when the news of Issus broke (Arr. 2.13.5; Curt. 4.1.37). The surrender of the mercenaries can hardly be dated later than the midsummer of 333.

⁵⁰Curt. 3.8.1: *iamque Graeci milites, quos Thymondas a Pharnabazo acceperat . . . ad Dareum pervenerant*.

⁵¹Wirth, 630, is aware of the difficulty, and suggests, rather lamely, that Alexander had heard only of the victory of Megalopolis but not yet of its consequences. But, if there was a continuing danger in Greece which merited large financial subsidies, the huge size of Amyntas' reinforcements is inexplicable. If we suppose that Menes' funds were intended to help build up Antipater's forces after the end of the war and the departure of Amyntas, Arrian's expression at 3.16.10 becomes, to say the least, inaccurate and misleading.

⁵²Aesch. 3.165: ὁ δὲ Ἀντίπατρος πολὺν χρόνον συνῆγε στρατόπεδον . . .

ate concatenation of events. Alexander's attention was occupied by the forthcoming engagement with Darius, while the Macedonian home army had lost a sizable proportion of its fighting men. It seems certain that the summer of 331 after the departure of Amyntas is the earliest possible time for the opening of the Megalopolis campaign.⁵³

How long the war lasted is more difficult to determine, thanks to the paucity of the extant sources. One thing, however, is certain; it was not soon over. That emerges clearly from the one contemporary source, Aeschines. Writing from the standpoint of August 330, he condemns Demosthenes for failing to take advantage of the high tide of Spartan success. At the turning point of the war Corrhagus had been defeated, Megalopolis was under siege, and Antipater had been for a long time collecting an army (3.165). There was clearly a long hiatus between the defeat of Corrhagus and Antipater's taking the field with his full levy. Aeschines, however, uses a very peculiar expression. At the time of crisis 'Αλέξανδρος ἔξω τῆς ἄρκτου καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεμίστήκει. The passage is inflated by rhetorical bombast, to be sure, and, significantly, Deinarchus, who adapted this part of Aeschines for his own attack on Demosthenes in 324, claims that Alexander was in India at the time of the war (Dein. 1.34)—an absurd exaggeration. But Aeschines, unlike Deinarchus, was writing within a year of the event, and there must be more to his expression than hyperbolic invention. It was a very valid point that Alexander was far from home, and Aeschines is unlikely to have wrecked it by palpably false hyperbole. Now the expression "beyond the north and virtually the entire inhabited world" reads very curiously as a description of Alexander's movements during 331.⁵⁴ During that

⁵³Alexander's movements between Egypt and Gaugemela are too scrappily documented for the arrival in Tyre to be precisely dated. He left Egypt ἅμα τῷ ἡρι ὑποφαίνοντι (Arr. 3.6.1), at the very beginning of spring. Pseudo-Callisthenes (1.32.4) reveals that in his day 25 Tybi was celebrated as the birthday of Alexandria. In 331 this fell on 7 April, which C. B. Welles took as the foundation date of the city (*Historia* 11 [1962] 284 with n. 67). But in Roman times 25 Tybi fell on 20 January, and that was the date of the birthday celebrations in the time of Pseudo-Callisthenes (cf. recension C: ὁ 'Αλέξανδρος καθίδρυσε Τῶβι, ἥτοι 'Ιαννουαρίῳ νομηνίᾳ). It could be argued that Alexandria was originally founded in January and that the celebrations down to the time of Augustus were held on different days of the Egyptian calendar to keep in time with the solar year (so Wilcken, *SB Berlin* 1928, 579 n. 3; P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* [Oxford 1972] 2.3 n. 9). The birthday of Alexandria, then, is in all probability irrelevant to the dating of Alexander's departure from Egypt. Arrian merely suggests a day in early March. The subsequent journey up the Palestinian coast was delayed by the settlement of Samaria (Curt. 4.8.9–11), and so one cannot easily calculate a time for the arrival in Tyre. The crossing of the Euphrates, however, is attested, not very reliably, to have taken place during Hecatombaeon (July/August) 331 (Arr. 3.7.1), and the departure from Tyre presumably took place around the end of June or beginning of July. Amphoterus' mission should therefore be dated roughly to June 331.

⁵⁴So Cawkwell 173; Lock 16.

year he moved from Egypt to the Euphrates, and from Assyria due south to Susa and Persis, all places very much within the *oikoumenê*. There is only one period which remotely fits the description, and that is Alexander's march through northern Mesopotamia just before Gaugamela. After crossing the Euphrates at Thapsacus Alexander continued north, it seems, following the Euphrates to the vicinity of Edessa and then skirting the foothills of the Armenian mountains.⁵⁵ When reports of this manoeuvre reached Greece, it may well have seemed that he was following in the footsteps of the Ten Thousand into Armenia. The crossing took place about August 331, and the news would have reached Greece within a month—to inspire Aeschines' rhetoric. In the autumn of 331, then, the war in the Peloponnese was still at its height and Antipater was still collecting forces. One might conjecture that the final battle at Megalopolis took place in the spring of 330, at the very beginning of the campaigning season.

Various other indications point to the same conclusion. We know from Aeschines that the Spartan hostages had not yet begun their journey to Alexander when the speech against Ctesiphon was delivered (3.133). These can hardly be any other than the fifty hostages demanded by Antipater from the Spartans.⁵⁶ Admittedly Diodorus does not state that these hostages were sent to Alexander, merely that they were demanded by Antipater;⁵⁷ the Spartans sent an additional embassy to Asia suing for pardon. But, even if the hostages were retained in Macedonia, Aeschines could easily have conflated the hostages and the embassy to add pathos to the Spartan predicament. It seems certain, however, that Aeschines was referring to a decision of the *synhedrion* of the Corinthian League, which had yet to be fully implemented,⁵⁸ and it is unlikely that the decision postdated the battle of Megalopolis by any great interval. What Antipater and the *synhedrion* had refused to do was to give a definite verdict, and the referral of the problem to Alexander is unlikely to have taken much deliberation. Aeschines, then, supports the theory that hostilities continued into 330. There is also a *terminus ante quem* for the

⁵⁵Arr. 3.7.3: ἔνθεν δὲ (from Thapsacus) ἐχώρει ἄνω, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ ἔχων τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμὸν καὶ τῆς Ἀρμενίας τὰ ὄρη. The wording certainly implies that Alexander kept fairly close to the course of the river (cf. 3.7.7). In that case he would have gone almost directly north to the vicinity of Edessa, where he would have been under the shadow of the Armenian mountains.

⁵⁶Cleitarchus, *FGrHist* 137 F 4; Diod. 17.73.6; Curt. 6.1.20; cf. Plut. *Apophth. Lac.* 235c. The connection was observed by Grote, 10.220 n. 1, and assumed by Cawkwell, 171.

⁵⁷Observed by Borza, 234.

⁵⁸It is clear from Aeschines that Alexander's verdict was not known, or even anticipated (τοῦτο πεισόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πατρίς ὅ τι ἂν ἐκείνῳ δοξῇ). Aeschines must be referring to the envoys who went to Asia to plead their case after the Corinthian *synhedrion* declined to give a verdict (Diod. 17.73.6; Curt. 6.1.20).

end of the war. When Alexander was in Areia in approximately September 330, reinforcements reached him sent by Antipater—3,000 Illyrian infantry and a mere 130 Thessalian cavalry.⁵⁹ They are small numbers, and they may have been the first contingent sent by Antipater after the victory at Megalopolis had ended the emergency in Greece. These forces had come a long way, some 2,000 miles from the Cilician coast, and their journey must have begun early in the year, hardly later than April. If this reasoning is correct, we have fairly precise termini for the war in the Peloponnese. It began in the summer of 331 after the departure of Amyntas and his army and carried over until the early spring of 330.

The only evidence against this hypothesis is Curtius' brief comment that the war was over before the battle of Gaugamela (October 1, 331).⁶⁰ This is a fragile support, however, for any theory. Curtius states in the same context that the war arose suddenly and ended quickly—in flat contradiction of the contemporary Aeschines and the abundant evidence (some of it provided by Curtius himself) of Agis' careful preparations for the war. *Repente ortum*, indeed! The synchronism with Gaugamela comes in an unreliable context and belongs to an unreliable genre⁶¹—events in reasonably close proximity tend to be chronologically conflated. If there is any truth at all in Curtius' statement, we should have to assume that the *news* of Gaugamela reached southern Greece at the same time that Megalopolis was fought. The report of Darius' defeat would not have filtered to the coast for a week or two, and the closing of the sailing season may have slowed down the diffusion of the news until the end of winter. That, I fear, is the only way of salvaging Curtius' credit, but it is not particularly compelling.

The other chronological suggestions in the historical sources are worthless. Justin mentions letters from Antipater reporting the end of Agis' war, which purportedly reached Alexander immediately after the death of Darius. These letters, however, are also stated to have reported the campaigns of Alexander the Molossian in Italy and of Zopyrion in Thrace.⁶² The latter episode is demonstrably datable to the years after 330,⁶³ and cannot logically have been reported in a letter of

⁵⁹Curtius 6.6.35. The 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry who arrived from Cilicia in May 330 (Curt. 5.7.12) were certainly mercenary forces raised in Asia Minor (Cawkwell 173 n. 2; de Ste. Croix 377).

⁶⁰Curt. 6.1.21: *hic fuit exitus belli, quod repente ortum prius tamen finitum est quam Dareum Alexander apud Arbelam superaret.*

⁶¹Compare the conflicting data on the battle of Himera in 480. It is synchronised both with Salamis (Hdt. 7.166; Arist. *Poet.* 23.1459a24) and with Thermopylae (Diod. 11.24.1). On this see the sensible remarks of Bengtson, *GG*³ 178 n. 3.

⁶²Just. 12.1.4. See the differing discussions of Cawkwell, 171, and Borza, 230–232.

⁶³Zopyrion clearly came to grief as *strategos* of Thrace (Curt. 10.1.43–5, *contra* Justin 12.2.16; cf. H. Bengtson, *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit* 1² (Munich 1964) 40).

Antipater written in early 330. Clearly Justin is using the letters of Antipater as a literary peg to introduce the peripheral history of the west during Alexander's reign, which we know Pompeius Trogus wrote up in large digressions in the course of his twelfth book. That is stated explicitly by the control source, the *Prologi*.⁶⁴ It is quite possible that Antipater wrote letters which reached Alexander in Hyrcania, but we certainly should not infer from Justin that their content was the end of Agis' war. Little, fortunately, need now be said about Diodorus' dating of the whole complex of Agis' war to the archon year 330/29 and his statement that the unrest in Greece only began after Gaugamela (17.62.1–2). This dating is universally and rightly rejected. In no area of his work is Diodorus more incompetent than in assigning the *κατὰ γένος* narrative of his source to a particular year. An error of a single year is trivial for a man who could antedate the Persian reconquest of Egypt in 343 by seven clear years.⁶⁵ The reference to Gaugamela as the catalyst for the unrest in mainland Greece may be a misunderstanding of a reference in his source to Issus, which did coincide with Agis' early intrigues.⁶⁶ Diodorus had Gaugamela on his mind and could easily have misinterpreted his source.

One problem remains for consideration. After the early summer of 331 Amphoterus drops out of history. He is not mentioned again by any of the Alexander sources, and, in particular, his fleet appears to have played no part in the war against Agis. The silence has caused concern, and the vagaries of the Aegean in summer have been adduced to explain his disappearance. Amphoterus could have been the victim of a violent storm.⁶⁷ Possibly so, but the sources for the Peloponnesian campaign of 331/0 are too scrappy—and lacunose—for any argument from silence to be profitably used. It is, moreover, difficult to see how Amphoterus could have played a major role in the campaign. The fighting took place well inland, in south-west Arcadia, and a fleet could only have played a subsidiary part, ravaging the Laconian coast and conveying funds and despatches to allies. Once war broke out in the Peloponnese, the focus automatically shifted from naval activity to land fighting, and Amphoterus' activities were necessarily peripheral. He may well have operated

Now in 331 Antipater had made his peace with Memnon and left him in charge of Thrace (Diod. 17.63.1). There is no hint that he was removed before the 320s. It was not until late 326 that Memnon arrived in India with reinforcements from Thrace (Curt. 9.3.21), and it is usually, and plausibly, held that Zopyrion succeeded him in 327 (Berve 2.254 no. 499; see, most recently, Lock 14; K. Ziegler, *RE* 10A. 763–764).

⁶⁴Trogus *Prol.* xii: *dictaeque in excessu res a praefecto eius Antipatro in Graecia gestae et ab Archidamo rege Lacedaemoniorum Molossoque Alexandro in Italia . . .*

⁶⁵Cf. Diod. 16.46.4 ff. for the dating of the invasion to 350/49. For the correct date, late 343, see, *exempli gratia*, G. L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 13 (1963) 122; 136–138.

⁶⁶Arr. 2.13.6; Diod. 17.48.1; Curt. 4.1.38–39.

⁶⁷So Badian 181; cf. Wirth 627.

in Crete, eradicating the Persian forces there, and sent part of the fleet to assist Antipater in Greece. The sources are silent, but that does not preclude Amphoterus from having carried out his original commission.⁶⁸ The fighting in Greece and Alexander's own meteoric progress during 330 deflected the limelight from the subsidiary theatres of war.

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APPENDIX

A fragment of Callisthenes, preserved by Polybius, provides important, if somewhat controversial, evidence for the strength of the Macedonian home army in 331. This records the arrival of 5,000 infantry and 800 cavalry when Alexander was on the point of entering Cilicia (Polyb. 12.19.1 = *FGrHist* 124 F 35). These figures have been dismissed as unreliable, at best a garbled version of the reinforcements at Gordium (so Beloch *GG* 3². 2.331–332; de Ste. Croix 377), or a total of all the reinforcements which reached Alexander in Asia Minor (Berve 1.179). That is perverse. Unreliable Callisthenes may be in certain contexts; as an “official” historian he was bound to retail contemporary Macedonian propaganda. But an item such as the arrival of reinforcements was completely neutral as propaganda, and there is no earthly reason why Callisthenes, a contemporary writing contemporaneously with the campaign, should have made a mistake or falsified the record (cf. P. A. Brunt, *JHS* 83 [1963] 37 n. 28). One might compare the equally “unreliable” Velleius Paterculus. Flatterer he may have been, but he was an eye-witness of Tiberius’ Pannonian campaigns, and no one has doubted the figures he gives for the reinforcements which reached Siscia during the winter of A.D. 7–8 (Vell. Pat. 2.113.1). It may be added that Callisthenes meticulously recorded the time of arrival of the reinforcements: μέλλοντι δ’ εἰς Κιλικίαν ἐμβάλλειν. The figures are explicit and can in no way be reconciled with any other reinforcements known to have reached Asia Minor. Nor can it be said that the extant sources give an exhaustive record of every reinforcement which reached Alexander. In Curtius there is a whole series of contingents not mentioned by Arrian (3.1.24; 3.7.8; 5.7.12; 6.6.35; 7.10.11–12 etc.), and there would be nothing surprising if he also omitted forces (he says nothing of the small contingent mentioned by Arrian 3.5.1). Indeed there is a possibility that the reinforcements mentioned by Callisthenes are identical with the unspecified forces which

⁶⁸Nothing subsequently is heard of Crete until 324, when Harpalus attempted to take refuge there (Diod. 17.108.8; 18.19.2; Curt. 10.2.3). We have no means of telling how extensive or successful Amphoterus’ activities had been.

Curtius says arrived in Ancyra in midsummer 333 (3.1.24). Now, according to Callisthenes, these troops came out of Macedonia, and their numbers were such that they must have weakened the home army. By the end of 333 more than 8,000 Macedonian infantry had been transferred to the Asian front. Amyntas took an additional 6,000 (Diod. 17.65.1; Curt. 5.1.40), which raised the numbers of the reinforcements sent to Alexander higher than the sum total of the infantry in the home army of 334. Under these circumstances it is most unlikely that Antipater would have countenanced the departure of Amyntas' forces once open war had broken out in the Peloponnese.